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BOOK REVIEW
Personal Injury Damages in Wisconsin: By James D. Ghiardi.*
Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1964. Pp. 144. $12.50.
An empty space has now been filled on the shelf of a Wisconsin
lawyer's working library. It is curious that text writers have long
neglected the law of damages. Only a half-dozen worthy books on the
subject have been written in the last half century. Wisconsin lawyers
have been consigned to encyclopedias and digests as a point of entry
in their research of the law. Professor Ghiardi's book is a welcome,
competent, and necessary addition to a lawyer's permanent library.
Originating as a series of articles in the Wisconsin Continuing Legal
Education Journal which developed the subject in depth, it has been
updated, placed in permanent form, and graced with a type size and
style of which I grow more fond with each passing year.
About three-fourths of non-family court civil litigation' involve
personal injury. Like the title of the book, that statement is deceptively
limiting. Because of the volume, personal injury is usually equated with
accidental negligent trauma to the person. However, its true breadth
encompasses most areas of damage resulting from intentional or
unintentional torts, and this test refers to the damages resulting from
such a broad range of subjects as assault and battery, false imprison-
ment, gross negligence or wanton conduct, conversion or destruction of
personal property, replevin, attachment, trespass, defamation, malicious
prosecution, wrongful discharge, conspiracy, alienation of affections,
seduction, breach of promise of marriage, and fraud and deceit.
The author's hallmark, evidenced in his other publications, is a
simple, direct style blended with a masterful talent for subject organi-
zation. Neither complex nor ponderous, the text is perceptive in its
analysis of the basis and reasoning of the decisions discussed. It is
rational and informative in criticism and comparison. Fortunately for
the reader, Professor Ghiardi has not forgotten his vocation. He de-
velops, informs, and directs the course of the law of damages, pro-
viding thought and direction for inconclusive areas of the subject rather
than blandly collecting case law.
Dealing first with the general law of damages, the author discusses
punitive damages, their theory and nature, evidentiary matters affecting
them, and a principal's liability for punitive damages. The bibliography
of cases on punitive damages is illustrative of the quick-focus character
of the book. Not content with sole concern for what the law is, the
author includes a comprehensive analysis of the unresolved (in Wis-
consin) liability of an insurer for punitive damages.
* Professor of Law, Marquette University.
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The transition to exemplary damages is made through discussion
of a timely subject, "Injury Due To Fright or Shock-Mental Suffer-
ing," which was discussed at the recent convention of the National
Conference of State Trial Judges where Milwaukee Circuit Judge
William I. O'Neill presented a paper entitled "The Trial Judge and
Problems of Proof of Damages for Injuries Negligently Inflicted With-
out Impact."
The work concludes with a chapter-by-chapter analysis of the more
familiar ingredients of personal injury damages: pain and suffering,
medical expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity to time of
trial, and such future losses.
Division of each chapter into topics with appropriate section head-
ings simplifies the use of the book for ready reference to a specific
point of research and contributes to easier understanding of the text.
Though not an involved legal matter, recovery of medical expenses
is complex and intricate in its evidentiary aspects. The collateral source
rule and the recovery of medical expenses by married women are
discussed in clear and simple fashion. They are becoming increasingly
important to lawyers as one sees more involvement by "collateral source"
subrogees in assertions of their newly-claimed subrogated interests in
personal injury cases. Although not equal to the frustration one meets
in attempting to pierce the veil of mystery enshrouding "disability,"
"pain and suffering," or "impairment of the ability to enjoy the benefits
of life," the recovery of loss of earnings and earning capacity is also
involved and intricate. The book handles the matters in a most ade-
quate fashion.
The trial of a difficult liability case of personal injury is a stimulat-
ing intellectual exercise, but academic and abortive to the litigant unless
supported by an effective proof of damage. In the eternal struggle for
a dynamic system of justice, those concerned in its administration often
forget that the assessment of dollar damages is a means by which the
end of justice is achieved. As lawyers we become overly engrossed in
liability, and litigants, similarly distracted, reject settlement offers be-
cause of principle rather than inadequacy. It is neither blasphemous
nor iconoclastic to remind ourselves that the means of our system in
the quest for justice in this field is not found near to the heart but
seated in the hip pocket. Unless the plaintiff's theories of liability and
damage intersect at trial, he has met defeat. Although professional
journals are increasingly concerned with trial techniques, there is a
customary obsession with proof of liability rather than proof of the
extent of resultant damage. Although the author does not attempt to
solve this problem directly, he has contributed to its solution indirectly,
for his book provides a Wisconsin lawyer with an easy and quick
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knowledge of the law of personal injury damages that will free many
hours of legal research for devotion to fact preparation for trial.
I have always felt that if one would write his jury argument after
preparing for trial, it would make apparent the additional evidence
that must be elicited to persuade the jury to one's position. For in-
stance, a plaintiff's attorney urges this:
In arguing pain and suffering, take the approach that has
been described as the 'whole-man' concept.
That is, when a part of a man has been injured or when a
part of him aches and pains, he cannot divorce or separate that
part from the whole man. When a man has a pounding head-
ache, it is not just his head that is affected, but his entire person-
ality, his entire enjoyment of living. Although his arms and legs
suffered no injury and function as well as ever, he doesn't feel
up to using them to bowl or golf or engage in other physical
activities, when his head hurts. He does not want to wrestle with
his children or take them to the park. He is impatient with his
wife. He is irritable with his fellow employees, and, perhaps,
even the customers, thus affecting his ability to perform his job.
In such a manner, a man's entire personality and mode of living
has been changed by reason of pain and suffering, and it is not
just an ache or pain to a small, confined area of the body.
If you are successful in showing how your client's injury
affects the whole man, his whole method of living, and his en-
joyment of living, this means something to the jurors and is
something for which they are willing to award compensation.
Although a particular juror may not feel that a headache is
worth a great deal, the same juror might be willing to compen-
sate adequately for a man's loss of the thrill of wrestling with
his small son or in his loss of ability to participate in the many
activities that make our life more enjoyable.2
And from the defense attorney's point of view, seldom does one hear
elicited from medical witnesses the information that intervertebral disc
degeneration begins at ages eighteen to twenty-five and progresses until
old age; that a study of disc patients established that 60 per cent gave
no history of trauma before the onset of pain ;3 or that 20 per cent of a
studied group of people with normal, uninjured necks had a straight-
ened lordotic reverse of the cervical spine.
The Committee on Medical Rating of Physical Impairment of the
American Medical Association, recognizing the complexity of the term
"disability," avoids the difficulty by distinguishing "disability" from
"impairment." The latter is defined as a purely medical condition, the
evaluation of which is a function which physicians alone are competent
2 Miller, Opening & Closing Statements from the Viewpoint of the Plaintiff's
Attorney, 10 PRAc. LAW. 87, 93 (Oct. 1964).
3 Rahilly, Lumbar Discography, MED. TRIAL TEcH. Q. 9 (Sept. 1964).
4 Frankel, Medical Revaluation of the "Whiplash," 13 DEFENSE L. J. 513, 517
(1964).
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to perform. Disability evaluation is defined as an appraisal of a patient's
present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is
affected by nonmedical factors such as age, sex, education, economic
and social environment, and the medical factor, permanent impairment.
The committee asserts that the evaluation of permanent disability is an
administrative (legal) decision. The committee says: "It is not and
never can be the duty of physicians to evaluate the social and economic
effects of permanent impairment. These effects must be evaluated by
administrators [triers of fact and law] in making determinations of
permanent disability." Nevertheless, the physician as an expert in
skeletal engineering is a logical witness from whom to elicit the rela-
tionship of the patient's medical condition and his personal efficiency
in the activities of daily living. I cannot help but feel that the medical
profession should hasten to fill this void, recognizing that because they
are doctors, they have a fund of knowledge that enables them to make
a substantial contribution of information. Although Professor Ghiardi
does not suggest courses of action in this regard, he has discussed many
of the Wisconsin cases which may provoke the reader's thought on how
this may be accomplished.
One can only hope that the brevity of this book will not inspire the
reader to a "once over lightly." There are many refinements of the
discussed legal propositions which, although presented, are not discussed
but will become apparent as the author's comprehensive understanding
of the subject and his direction is acquired by the reader.
JOHN A. DECKER**
** Judge, Circuit Court of Milwaukee County.
[Vol. 48
